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Abstract: Reputation is a complex and multidimensional concept that may be organized in downside
and upside reputational risk. In this article, we present a formal modelling for the management
capabilities of environmental management and reporting over reputational risk, considering that
reputational risk is becoming increasingly important for organizations and it directly depends
on the information available about companies’ environmental performances. As long as the
effectiveness of communication and disclosure plays a key role in the process, the usefulness of
environmental management and reporting as a hedging instrument for reputational risk is addressed
through different levels of information transparency. When considering a scenario of voluntary
reporting, we show that environmentally concerned companies can reduce the cost of environmental
management as a reputational risk strategy, as well as reducing the potential loss of reputational
value from reputational threats and increasing the potential profit from reputational opportunities.
In the context of mandatory reporting, we highlight the role of assurance companies as bearers of
the risk of bad reputations for non-concerned companies. As a result, this novel approach applies
theoretical oriented research from options theory to reputational risk management literature, so that
it benefits from the option’s well known theory, robustness, and conclusions.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility; corporate reputation; reputation management;
risk management; financial risk
1. Introduction
Reputation is a complex and multidimensional concept [1] that, following the study of
Reference [2], may be organized in downside and upside reputational risk. On the other hand, there is a
growing political and academic interest in the use of information as a quasi-regulatory mechanism and
its relation to organizational reputation [3–5], with the recent case of Volkswagen being a prominent
one [6]. In this context, companies must be prepared to increase their reporting of non-financial
information and to manage the impact of this information provision on their reputation. Environmental
management can be defined as a set of corporate decisions and actions that aim to develop, deploy,
execute, and control the corporate environmental policy. Environmental management is presented in
this paper as a specific tool for reputational risk hedging, assuming that environmental management
influences corporate reputation and customers’ satisfaction [7,8]. It is also assumed that for this idea to
be true, environmental management has to improve corporate environmental performance and that
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this has to be effectively communicated to society, either directly (through company reporting and
public relations) or indirectly (through governments and media coverage).
We developed a formal modelling to address the hedging capabilities of environmental
management and reporting over reputational risk, using the flexibility granted by the options theory
to consider different levels of information transparency. When considering a scenario of voluntary
reporting, we show that environmentally concerned companies can reduce the cost of environmental
management as a reputational risk strategy, as well as reduce the potential loss of reputational value
from reputational threats and increase the potential profit from reputational opportunities. In the
context of mandatory reporting, we highlight the role of assurance companies as bearers of the risk of
bad reputations for non-concerned companies.
The rest of the manuscript is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation between
environmental management and corporate reputation, pointing out how environmental reporting
mediates in this relation. Section 3 presents the method and formalizes the hedging role of good and
bad environmental practices over reputational risk using results from the options theory. Section 4
elaborates on the hedging capabilities of environmental management over reputational risk along
different levels of information transparency. Finally, Section 5 concludes and outlines recommendations
for future research.
2. Environmental Management as a Driver of Corporate Reputation: The Importance of
Environmental Reporting
Environmental performance is related to corporate reputation and customers’ satisfaction [7,8],
and normally it can be expected that bad environmental performers will be penalised with a bad
reputation and that good environmental performers will be rewarded with a good reputation [9].
In this context, and assuming that environmental management leads to improved environmental
performance [10], environmental management can be thought of as a specific tool for reputational
risk management.
It is possible that environmental management in itself can contribute to the improvement of
corporate reputation if some signalling option is in use, for example, certification [11]. Yet, obviously,
as long as reputation depends on the information available and public perception, the effect of
environmental management on reputation will be mediated by the reporting efforts of the company
and other institutions (such as governments or mass media), as well as by how these efforts
are perceived by the public. There is a risk that environmental reporting can be understood as
green-washing [12]. In fact, some studies have examined the level and nature of the environmental
information voluntarily disclosed by firms and found that they may not be indicative of their
underlying environmental performance [13], pointing to the need to establish some mandatory
framework to promote environmental reporting and even its assurance. The use of environmental
disclosure or, more generally, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure to acquire greater
legitimacy has already been analysed and considered as a long-term investment in reputation [14,15];
some authors even point out that corporate reputation can be more influenced by what companies
report than by what they actually do [9].
If corporate environmental management and reporting have an impact on corporate reputation,
the regulatory authorities could promote the use of information about the environmental performance
of companies as an environmental policy instrument. In this sense, Arora and Gangopadhyay [16]
conclude that the public image of a company is a key driving force of voluntary over-compliance
with environmental regulations. Additionally, Caplan [3] considers that under certain circumstances
polluting firms self-regulate by internalizing the forward effect of their environmental reputation, and
Banerjee and Shogren [17] advance that firms concerned about their reputation would exert at least
the optimal level of effort in environmental protection. Johnstone and Labonne [11] consider that the
environmental management area is characterized by strong information asymmetries, as its quality is
not readily observable. The requirement to disclose information on the environmental performance of
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companies is a vehicle that environmental regulation could use in order to reduce these information
asymmetries [5], encouraging stakeholders to exercise disciplinary pressure on the behaviour of firms.
Mitchell [18] acknowledges also that disclosure-based policies can influence corporate behaviour,
making targeted actors aware of their own behaviours and moving them to alter these behaviours in
positive ways prior to (and independent of) the public disclosure process itself.
The relation between environmental performance and environmental reporting has also been
studied, although offering mixed results depending on the theory applied to explain managerial
behaviour [13]. In this paper, we adopt the perspective of the voluntary disclosure theory,
which predicts that firms with superior environmental performance will have incentives to disclose
in order to differentiate themselves. In addition, even in a mandatory reporting context, firms with
better environmental records (measured by toxic emissions) have higher levels of environmental
disclosures [19]. However, nowadays a credibility gap is acknowledged regarding sustainability
reports, and assurance can play a valuable role in helping to ensure that the environmental information
provided is reliable and credible. The concept of assurance includes not only reports verification,
but also advice on environmental performance, corporate governance, stakeholder engagement,
and other areas central to corporate responsibility, with the aim of reinforcing the credibility
and quality of corporate sustainability strategies. The assurance market is a competitive and
mainly unregulated market with various types of assurance suppliers from inside and outside the
accounting profession [20], and it has two principal reference standards which try to ensure the
quality of the assurance work: the International Standard on Assurance Engagement (lSAE) 3000,
and the Account-Ability 1000 Assurance Standard (AA 1000AS). However, some individual countries’
accounting authorities have also issued specific standards for the auditing of sustainability reports.
We refer to the work of Manetti and Becatti [21] to examine some critical points of present assurance
services on sustainability reports, as well as a number of suggested improvements for future assurance
standards. Ackers, Eccles, and Parker [22] state also that voluntary CSR assurance has resulted in the
inconsistent application of CSR assurance practices, and argue that this deficiency may be overcome
through the imposition of a mandatory CSR assurance regime. Furthermore, assurance is acquiring
importance in the context of the expanding use of integrated reporting, which needs specific assurance
standards for reports that combine financial and non-financial information.
3. An Options Theory Approach to Reputational Risk Hedging Through
Environmental Management
3.1. Methods
Since the proposal of the Black-Scholes equation to calculate the premium of a European
option [23], the method originally conceived for valuing financial options has been widely
used for the analysis of different managerial decisions, including corporate valuation [24–26],
investment projects [27–30], research and development [31,32], and budgeting [33].
Indeed, the options theory framework has already been applied in the fields of corporate
social responsibility [34] and risk management [35], with some recent results related to reputational
risk [36,37]. Thus, and following a similar approach, this article elaborates on a novel theoretical
analysis of environmental management as a hedging instrument over reputational risk, considering that
the options theory provides the flexibility needed in order to capture its varying hedging capability
through different levels of information transparency. The valuation of the corporate reputation offered
by the market will be represented by S. Consequently, considering that corporate reputation can
be understood as an underlying asset, the value of which needs to be protected, and given that
environmental management can be thought of as a hedging instrument over that underlying asset,
we will be denoting the result of this reputational risk management strategy with V. The company that
wants to get the protection has to pay a premium in terms of effort in environmental management.
Moreover, this effort gives the company the right to reach a certain level of reputational valuation.
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From that strike valuation level onwards, the option results are activated and the company gets a
reputational payoff.
For clarity purposes, in order to understand how the protection offered by environmental
management works and to determine the reputational result of this hedging strategy, the companies
will be classified into two different groups: companies whose reputational risk is actively managed
through environmental management (these ones will be called A-companies) and companies whose
reputational risk is not actively managed through environmental management (these ones will be
referred to as B-companies). The A-companies and the B-companies are the agents involved in
the formalization of the environmental management hedging capabilities, and this formalization
has two dimensions depending on whether the market rewards good environmental management
practices or penalizes bad environmental management practices: In the first case, companies develop
environmental management to take advantage of reputational opportunities in order to build a good
reputation; and in the second case, companies invest in environmental management in order to protect
against reputational threats and avoid a bad reputation.
3.2. Environmental Management as an Option to Build a Good Reputation
Regarding the first dimension, the A-companies invest in environmental management in order to
build a good reputation. On the other side, the B-companies, which do not carry out environmental
management, are not prepared to react in the appropriate manner when reputational opportunities
arise, so the potential reputational advantages of these opportunities will be lost. From this point
of view, it can be stated that the A-companies are buying the chance to get positive reputational
consequences and build a good reputation, that is, they are taking a long position in a call contract
over the underlying asset of corporate reputation. On the other side, as B-companies are wasting
reputational opportunities in favour of A-companies, it can be affirmed that they are selling the chance
of building a good reputation for A-companies, that is, they are taking the complementary short
position in that call contract over the corporate reputation asset. The long and short positions of the
call contract are presented in Figure 1 [38].
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The option gets activated when the valuation of the corporate reputation offered by the market
is above the valuation level that the A-companies have the right to get according to the investment
in environmental management quantified through the premium. This valuation level corresponds
to the strike price of the option and is represented by K. If the market is especially sensitive to good
environmental management practices and offers a high valuation of good environmental management,
the A-companies have complete interest in disclosing their environmental commitment in order
to get the reputational reward in terms of this higher valuation. Otherwise, if the market offers
a low valuation of these good environmental management practices, the A-companies get a null
reputational result from their investment in environmental management. The premium of the call
contract that collects the investment in environmental management carried out by the A-companies
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depends on the valuation of corporate reputation offered by the market, as well as the volatility
over that valuation. Thus, the environmental management effort demanded of the company from
the market is larger when the market offers a bigger reward to good environmental management
practices, or when the volatility observed in the market around that valuation increases. On the other
hand, if the market does not offer a high valuation of good environmental management practices or
the volatility around this valuation is small, the required amount of investment in environmental
management decreases. While the valuation of good environmental management practices gets
higher, the A-companies get a bigger reputational reward that compensates the initial effort quantified
through the premium, and the A-companies are driven to a region of potentially unlimited reputational
profits. Otherwise, if the market does not reward good environmental management practices,
the A-companies lose the investment represented by the premium, this quantity being the limit
of their potential loss. The reputational result for B-companies is the opposite of the reputational result
for A-companies. Thus, when the market offers a high valuation of good environmental management
practices, the B-companies do not get the reputational reward and suffer a reputational loss in terms of
the opportunity cost related to the wasted reputational opportunities. On the other hand, when the
market does not reward good environmental management practices, the B-companies get the benefit
corresponding to the premium invested by the A-companies. Given that this is an investment that
the B-companies do not accomplish, it can be considered as a minor cost for them, so compared with
the A-companies, the B-companies have a benefit in terms of the free funds corresponding to the
non-undertaken investment in environmental management, and this is the only potential benefit that
they could accomplish [38].
Consequently, the call contract can be summarized by stating that it is a hedging instrument
over the underlying asset of corporate reputation. When the reputational opportunities arise,
the A-companies are in position of taking advantage of them, so their reputation improves. On the
other hand, the B-companies have no chance to achieve the positive reputational consequences of
those opportunities, so their reputation turns out to be poor compared with the reputation held by
the A-companies. Thus, there is a transfer of good reputation in favour of the A-companies and to
the detriment of the B-companies. It can be stated that the A-companies have the right to buy or get
good reputation through the activation of the option, and when this occurs the B-companies have the
obligation to sell and relinquish a good reputation.
3.3. Environmental Management as an Option to Avoid a Bad Reputation
Regarding the second dimension of the environmental management strategy, which comprises the
protection against damages derived from reputational threats, the A-companies invest in environmental
management in order to get far away from a bad reputation. Meanwhile, the B-companies do not
accomplish this investment, so when reputational threats show up (for instance, in the regulatory
demand of disclosure of information on environmental performance) they are not ready to respond in
a suitable way (they cannot communicate a good environmental performance), and they cannot avoid
the reputational damage. From this point of view, it can be stated that the A-companies are buying the
chance to sell the negative consequences of reputational threats and avoid a bad reputation, that is,
they are taking a long position in a put contract over the underlying asset of corporate reputation.
On the other side, if the B-companies are suffering damage from reputational threats, it can be said
that they are buying the bad reputation that the A-companies are selling, that is, they are taking the
complementary short position in that put contract over the corporate reputation asset. The long and
short positions are presented in Figure 2 [38].
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The option gets activated when the valuation of bad environmental management practices
derived from the market is below the strike valuation level that the A-companies have the right
to reach, according to their investment in environmental management. If the market is especially
sensitive to bad environmental management practices and reacts by penalizing them by offering
a low reputational valuation, the A-companies will disclose their environmental commitment in
order to avoid this reputational penalty and get the correct reputational valuation according to their
reputational effort. Otherwise, if the market does not penalize bad environmental management
practices and offers a high valuation of bad reputations, the A-companies get a null reputational
result from their investment in environmental management. The premium of the put contract,
which represents the investment carried out by A-companies in environmental management in order
to protect against reputational threats and avoid a bad reputation, depends on the valuation of
bad environmental management practices offered by the market, and on the volatility over that
valuation. The reputational effort demanded by the company from the market in order to avoid the
reputational damage related to bad environmental management practices is larger when the market
offers a low valuation of them, that is, when the reputational penalty imposed by the market is higher,
or when the volatility observed in the market valuation of bad environmental management practices
increases. On the other hand, if the market does not offer a poor valuation of bad environmental
management practices, or the volatility around this valuation is small, the amount of investment in
environmental management required to avoid reputational damages decreases. While the valuation of
bad environmental management practices gets lower, the A-companies avoid more severe reputational
damage, and this profit in terms of the non-suffered reputational loss compensates for the initial
effort quantified through the premium, driving the A-companies to a region of potentially unlimited
reputational profits (by avoiding potentially unlimited reputational losses). Otherwise, if the market
does not penalize bad environmental management practices, the A-companies lose the investment in
avoiding the reputational damage represented by the premium, this quantity being the limit of their
potential loss. The reputational result for the B-companies is the opposite of the reputational result
for A-companies. Thus, when the market offers a low valuation of bad environmental management
practices, the B-companies suffer the reputational damage and get the subsequent reputational loss.
On the other hand, when the market does not penalize bad environmental management practices,
the B-companies get the benefit corresponding to the premium invested by the A-companies in
avoiding reputational damage. Once again, it can be considered as a minor cost for the B-companies,
because compared with the A-companies they have a benefit in terms of the non-accomplished
investment in environmental management, and this is the only potential benefit that they could
accomplish [38].
Consequently, the put contract can be summarized by stating that it is another hedging instrument
over the underlying asset of corporate reputation. When the reputational threats arise, the A-companies
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are in position of getting protection against them, so their reputational valuations do not suffer. On the
other hand, the B-companies have no chance to avoid the negative reputational consequences of those
threats, so their reputation turns out to be poor when compared with the reputation held by the
A-companies. Thus, there is a transfer of bad reputation from the A-companies to the B-companies.
It can be stated that the A-companies have the right to sell or get rid of a bad reputation through the
activation of the option, and when this occurs the B-companies have the obligation to buy or get a
bad reputation.
To sum up, the two dimensions of environmental management described above (to foster a
good reputation or to avoid a bad reputation), it can be said that there is a bidirectional reputational
flow between the companies in the market, where the A-companies have the right to get the good
reputational consequences derived from reputational opportunities that the B-companies lose through
a call contract, and simultaneously the A-companies have the right to avoid the bad reputational
consequences derived from reputational threats that the B-companies are suffering through a put
contract (Figure 3).Sustainability 2017, 9, 376 7 of 14 
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Thus, the A-companies will choose to activate the call contract if the market begins to be
especially prone to good environmental management practices in order to get the reputational reward,
and alternatively they will choose to activate the put contract if the market starts to be particularly
sensitive to bad environmental management practices in order to avoid the reputational penalty.
So, the environmental management value gets higher while the market increases its reward for good
environmental management practices, or increases its penalty for bad environmental management
practices. If the market does not opt for any of the two directions described above, either rewarding
good environmental management practices or penalizing bad environmental management practices,
the A-companies cannot use any of the options, and while this situation persists they are losing the
amount compromised in environmental management through the premiums. But the options are
still there, in a sleeping state, ready to be used when the situation requires the activation of one of
them. When this arises, the A-companies are guided to a region of potentially unlimited reputational
profits, thus compensating for the initial effort. The reputational result for the B-companies is the
opposite of the reputational result held by the A-companies. This means that the B-companies only
get a reputational profit in terms of the non-undertaken environmental management effort when
the market remains immune to environmental management practices, either positive or negative.
However, when the market changes this behaviour, the B-companies enter a region of potentially
unlimited reputational losses, either by the reputational opportunity cost derived from the call contract,
or by the reputational damage derived from the put contract [41].
If the situation of adverse selection persists, the growing lack of confidence that the market has
will lead to a continuous decrease in the valuation offered. The A-companies would be driven out of the
market by the B-companies, because their environmental management effort has few chances of being
correctly recognized, rewarded, and compensated by the market. That is why the A-companies
have an interest in informing the market about their environmental management commitment,
fighting against adverse selection. In this way, the principle of full disclosure or unravelling result
gets established [42,43]. According to this principle, under ideal conditions a company cannot hide
significant information on its own reputational valuation from the market. In fact, the lack of disclosure
can be interpreted as bad news by the market. However, the reality of the financial markets does
not support the full disclosure principle, and partial disclosure equilibriums (or even no disclosure
equilibriums) are usual. The reasons why companies do not communicate all significant information
to the market and why investors do not succeed in discovering this lack of corporate transparency are
explained by Caby and Piñeiro [44].
4.2. Voluntary Disclosure
Following the idea initially proposed by Fama [45], different types of efficiency can be identified
in the market—weak, semi-strong, and strong—in order to explain how information is factored
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in prices. Similarly, in an environmental management and reporting context, different degrees of
transparency or disclosure can be identified: low, medium and high. In these disclosure scenarios,
the market anticipates that the communicative companies are those that invest in environmental
management (A-companies) and, as a consequence, the non-communicative ones are the ones that
do not invest in environmental management (B-companies). So, the market has a new information
source that allows market members to differentiate good environmental management practices from
bad environmental management practices, and this phenomenon leads to a new situation where the
value of the reputations related to good practices increases, while the value of the reputations related
to bad practices decreases. This means that the call and the put contracts do not have the same strike
valuation level anymore: the call contract has a higher strike valuation level than the put contract.
Furthermore, the difference between these two strike valuation levels is directly related to the degree of
disclosure, that is, as long as the degree of disclosure gets higher that difference increases and the two
strike valuation levels become increasingly distant from each other. As a consequence, the previous
straddle scenario has evolved into a new strangle schema, where the long position is taken by the
A-companies and the short position is taken by the B-companies. The long and short positions of a
strangle are presented in Figure 5 [41].
Now the A-companies are in a better situation than before, because the market pays more attention
to their environmental management commitment and offers a better valuation for it. Both premiums
decrease compared with the previous scenario. This means that the quantity of the environmental
management effort carried out by the A-companies is lower, because the market is more sensitive
to environmental issues, so the investment in environmental management is better recognized and
achieving a reputational profit is slightly easier. As a result, the A-companies have evolved into a
position characterized by lower cost, lower maximum loss, and higher maximum profit than in the
previous situation. Consequently, the B-companies are exposed to a lower maximum profit and a
higher maximum loss [46].
Sustainability 2017, 9, 376 9 of 14 
profit than in the previous situation. Consequently, the B-companies are exposed to a lower 
maximum profit and a higher maximum loss [46]. 
 
Figure 5. Hedging reputational risk in a voluntary disclosure scenario. 
4.3. Mandatory Reporting 
Extending the analysis, a different scenario arises if environmental disclosure is no longer a 
voluntary activity and becomes mandatory, so that the companies have the need to protect 
themselves against potential damages derived from reputational threats through assurance of the 
reported environmental information, assuming that public confidence in environmental information 
may be enhanced by the reputational capital associated with the purchase of assurance [47], and that 
the risk of a bad reputation is transferred to the assurance company. In this situation, the presence of 
assurance breaks the bidirectional flow between the A-companies and the B-companies previously 
described. There is still a transfer of good reputational consequences derived from reputational 
opportunities in favour of the A-companies and to the detriment of the B-companies. However now, 
the bad reputational consequences derived from reputational threats are transferred from both the 
A-companies and the B-companies to the assurance companies (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Reputational flows in a mandatory reporting scenario. 
Regarding the A-companies, there are no substantial changes from the previous situation and 
they are still holding a long strangle position. However, two slight differences concerning the put 
contract have to be pointed out: First, the premium of the put contract (that corresponded to the 
investment in environmental management and reporting in order to avoid the negative consequences 
of reputational threats) is now equal to the assurance fee that the A-companies pay; and second, the 
counterpart of the A-companies in this put contract is now the assurance companies. 
On the other hand, the scenario for the B-companies is completely different. Choosing not to 
invest in environmental management and reporting is not an alternative anymore. The B-companies 
Figure 5. Hedging reputational risk in a voluntary disclosure scenario.
4.3. Mandatory Reporting
Extending the an lysis, a different scenario arises if environment l disclosure is no longer a
voluntary activity a d becomes mandatory, so that the companies have the need to protect themselves
against potential damages derived from reputational threats through assurance of the reported
environmental information, assuming that public confidence in environmental information may
be enhanced by the reputational capital associated with the purchase of assurance [47], and that the
risk of a bad reputation is transferred to the assurance company. In this situation, the presence of
assurance breaks the bidirectional flow between the A-companies and the B-companies previously
described. There is still a transfer of good reputational consequences derived from reputational
opportunities in favour of the A-companies and to the detriment of the B-companies. However now,
the bad reputational consequences derived from reputational threats are transferred from both the
A-companies and the B-companies to the assurance companies (Figure 6).
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Regarding the A-compa ie , there are no substantial changes from th pr vi us situation and they
are still holding a l ng stra gle position. However, tw slight differen es con e ning th put contract
have to be pointed out: First, the premium of the put contract (that correspo ded to the investment in
environmental management and reporting in order to avoid the negative consequences of reputational
threats) is now equal to the assurance fee that the A-companies pay; and second, the counterpart of the
A-companies in this put contract is now the assurance companies.
On the other hand, the scenario for the B-companies is completely different. Choosing not to
invest in environmental management and reporting is not an alternative anymore. The B-companies
are required to carry out a primary reputational risk hedging strategy, consisting of managing the
second dimension of reputational risk, that is, the one concerning the protection against reputational
threats. This means that the B-companies are now holding a long position in a put contract, where the
counterparts are the assurance companies. However, given that the first dimension (the one regarding
taking advantage of reputational opportunities) is still not managed, they keep holding the short
position in the call contract where the A-companies are taking the long position. This means that the
B-companies are combining a long put position with a short call position, resulting in a short combo
hedging strategy. The double counterpart of the B-companies, constituted by the A-companies and the
assurance companies, holds the complementary long combo position. The short and long positions of
the combo strategy are presented in Figure 7 [41].
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In this situa ion, the B-companies are prot cted agains reputational thr ats, b they are not
prepared yet to exploit reputational opportunities. When reputational threats arise, the put option is
activated and the B-companies get the reputational protection derived from the assurance contract,
Sustainability 2017, 9, 376 11 of 15
so the value of this strategy turns out to be positive. However, when there are reputational opportunities
wasted by the B-companies, the value of this strategy is negative due to the opportunity cost in terms of
the non-conquered reputational profit derived from those opportunities. The investment accomplished
by the B-companies is the assurance fee that corresponds to the premium of the put contract, but it
is compensated for by the non-undertaken investment in environmental management, which relates
to the reputational opportunities that correspond to the premium of the call contract. Consequently,
an interesting fact arises, because this reputational investment can be either positive or negative,
depending on which of the two premiums is greater. Thus, it is positive when the assurance fee
dominates, but becomes negative when the environmental management effort demanded by the
market from the A-companies in order to earn positive reputational consequences derived from
reputational opportunities (which is collected in the call premium) increases [41].
In this scenario, when the premise of mandatory environmental reporting is assimilated by the
market after a certain time of maturity, the attitude towards bad environmental management practices
changes because all potential reputational damages are covered by assurance. This means that there
is no need for maintaining two different valuation schemas for good environmental management
practices and for bad environmental management practices. From now on, a unique valuation schema is
offered. As a consequence, the two strike valuation levels are no longer different. Consequently, the call
contract and the put contract have the same strike valuation level. As a result, the A-companies return
to the initial long straddle scenario, which means that the cost and the maximum loss increases and
the maximum profit decreases, as a consequence of higher demands from a market that is increasingly
concerned with environmental issues. On the other hand, the B-companies are holding a long put
position and a short call position, as in the previous situation, but now they are valuated at the same
strike valuation level. So, the hedging strategy carried out by the B-companies is transformed into a
short synthetic future. The double counterpart of the B-companies, integrated by the A-companies and
assurance companies, holds the complementary long synthetic future. The short and long positions of
a synthetic future are presented in Figure 8 [38].
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The value of this reputational risk management strategy for B-companies is positive when the
market valuation of corporate reputations is below the strike valuation level that the company has
the right to get, that is, when corporate reputation is underestimated and, as a consequence, there is
a reputational loss that activates the protection offered by assurance. On the other hand, when the
market valuation of the corporate reputation is above the strike valuation level that these companies
have the right to get, this means that the market is rewarding good environmental management
practices and the valuation offered is the one that the B-companies would get if they were not wasting
reputational opportunities. Consequently, there is a reputational opportunity cost that explains the
negative value of the reputational risk hedging strategy in this scenario. As in the previous situation,
the effort of the B-companies is the assurance fee that corresponds to the premium of the put contract,
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which is compensated for by the premium of the call contract that represents the non-undertaken
investment in detecting reputational opportunities. Once more, this reputational investment can be
either positive or negative [38].
5. Conclusions
The main objective of this essay has been proposing a formal modelling for the hedging capabilities
of environmental management and reporting over reputational risk. The review of previous literature
on the relationship between environmental management and reputation has revealed that some
important issues mediate in this relationship: environmental reporting, its voluntary or mandatory
nature, and the need of assurance. Consequently, the link between environmental management and
reputation can be analysed under different levels of transparency.
The options theory has been proposed as a convenient methodology due to its flexibility
that allows the consideration of different levels of information asymmetry and several scenarios,
showing that environmental management acts like a hedging instrument over the company’s
reputation, contributing to the achievement of its objectives. When considering a scenario of
voluntary reporting, we show that the environmentally concerned companies can reduce the cost
of environmental management as a reputational risk strategy, as well as reduce the potential loss
of reputational value from reputational threats and increase the potential profit from reputational
opportunities. In the context of mandatory reporting, we have highlighted the role of assurance
companies as bearers of the risk of bad reputations for non-concerned companies, to the extent that
assurance companies get involved both in the design and implementation of their client’s sustainability
strategies as well as in the verification of their sustainability reports. Table 1 summarizes the main
findings for companies concerned with environmental management and reporting along with the
different scenarios covered in the study.
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Given that reputational risk is becoming increasingly important for companies, the corporate
management field could benefit from this paper’s contributions, taking them as a starting point to
reach a full integration of environmental management into corporate management as a reputational
risk hedging strategy. Moreover, the proposed methodological framework would help to reduce the
overall exposure of a company to reputational risk and, therefore, it would positively contribute to the
shareholder value creation. This is also a contribution to the academic field, as there is an absence of
studies that analyse the issue of “whether or not it pays to be green” that consider the intermediate
variables that influence the performance links, such as reputation [8]. Consequently, there is an open
avenue for further research to empirically examine the link between companies’ reputations and
their corporate value, as well as to develop an empirical investigation of this paper’s theoretical
propositions. From an academic perspective, this paper also advances the literature by integrating the
consideration of environmental management, environmental reporting, and reputational risk under
the framework provided by the options theory, something that to our knowledge has not been done
yet. Finally, we have reviewed the concerns regarding the reliability of voluntary environmental
disclosures, which signal a need for both enhanced mandatory reporting requirements and improved
enforcement [13], and also for assurance of CSR information. Consequently, policy makers could also
find our framework useful to analyse the suitability of incentives for environmental disclosures, or the
need for a mandatory disclosure, to promote corporate environmental behaviour, which might imply a
less active and costly role for the regulating authorities [3]. More concretely, national governments
across the European Union that are having to transpose to their regulatory framework in accordance
with the recent Directive on non-financial information disclosure, need to carefully analyse the
implications of voluntary and mandatory reporting as well as the role of assurance, and could
base such analysis on this paper’s contributions. As a final recommendation, corporate and public
policies, as well as academic fields could take into account this paper’s contributions as a starting
point to justify the need for demanding greater transparency and assurance on the environmental
performance of companies, and the convenience of developing further research on the relationship
between environmental management and reputational risk.
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